The Seven Master Spirits

16:7.1In­tel­li­gence alone can­not ex­plain the moral na­ture. Moral­ity, virtue, is in­dige­nous to hu­man per­son­al­ity. Moral in­tu­ition, the re­al­iza­tion of duty, is a com­po­nent of hu­man mind en­dow­ment and is as­so­ci­ated with the other in­alien­ables of hu­man na­ture: sci­en­tific cu­rios­ity and spir­i­tual in­sight. Man’s men­tal­ity far tran­scends that of his an­i­mal cousins, but it is his moral and re­li­gious na­tures that es­pe­cially dis­tin­guish him from the an­i­mal world.

16:7.2The se­lec­tive re­sponse of an an­i­mal is lim­ited to the mo­tor level of be­hav­ior. The sup­posed in­sight of the higher an­i­mals is on a mo­tor level and usu­ally ap­pears only af­ter the ex­pe­ri­ence of mo­tor trial and er­ror. Man is able to ex­er­cise sci­en­tific, moral, and spir­i­tual in­sight prior to all ex­plo­ration or ex­per­i­men­ta­tion.

16:7.3Only a per­son­al­ity can know what it is do­ing be­fore it does it; only per­son­al­i­ties pos­sess in­sight in ad­vance of ex­pe­ri­ence. A per­son­al­ity can look be­fore it leaps and can there­fore learn from look­ing as well as from leap­ing. A non­per­sonal an­i­mal or­di­nar­ily learns only by leap­ing.

16:7.4As a re­sult of ex­pe­ri­ence an an­i­mal be­comes able to ex­am­ine the dif­fer­ent ways of at­tain­ing a goal and to se­lect an ap­proach based on ac­cu­mu­lated ex­pe­ri­ence. But a per­son­al­ity can also ex­am­ine the goal it­self and pass judg­ment on its worth-while­ness, its value. In­tel­li­gence alone can dis­crim­i­nate as to the best means of at­tain­ing in­dis­crim­i­nate ends, but a moral be­ing pos­sesses an in­sight which en­ables him to dis­crim­i­nate be­tween ends as well as be­tween means. And a moral be­ing in choos­ing virtue is nonethe­less in­tel­li­gent. He knows what he is do­ing, why he is do­ing it, where he is go­ing, and how he will get there.

16:7.5When man fails to dis­crim­i­nate the ends of his mor­tal striv­ing, he finds him­self func­tion­ing on the an­i­mal level of ex­is­tence. He has failed to avail him­self of the su­pe­rior ad­van­tages of that ma­te­rial acu­men, moral dis­crim­i­na­tion, and spir­i­tual in­sight which are an in­te­gral part of his cos­mic-mind en­dow­ment as a per­sonal be­ing.

16:7.6Virtue is righ­teous­ness—con­for­mity with the cos­mos. To name virtues is not to de­fine them, but to live them is to know them. Virtue is not mere knowl­edge nor yet wis­dom but rather the re­al­ity of pro­gres­sive ex­pe­ri­ence in the at­tain­ment of as­cend­ing lev­els of cos­mic achieve­ment. In the day-by-day life of mor­tal man, virtue is re­al­ized by the con­sis­tent choos­ing of good rather than evil, and such choos­ing abil­ity is ev­i­dence of the pos­ses­sion of a moral na­ture.

16:7.7Man’s choos­ing be­tween good and evil is in­flu­enced, not only by the keen­ness of his moral na­ture, but also by such in­flu­ences as ig­no­rance, im­ma­tu­rity, and delu­sion. A sense of pro­por­tion is also con­cerned in the ex­er­cise of virtue be­cause evil may be per­pe­trated when the lesser is cho­sen in the place of the greater as a re­sult of dis­tor­tion or de­cep­tion. The art of rel­a­tive es­ti­ma­tion or com­par­a­tive mea­sure­ment en­ters into the prac­tice of the virtues of the moral realm.

16:7.8Man’s moral na­ture would be im­po­tent with­out the art of mea­sure­ment, the dis­crim­i­na­tion em­bod­ied in his abil­ity to scru­ti­nize mean­ings. Like­wise would moral choos­ing be fu­tile with­out that cos­mic in­sight which yields the con­scious­ness of spir­i­tual val­ues. From the stand­point of in­tel­li­gence, man as­cends to the level of a moral be­ing be­cause he is en­dowed with per­son­al­ity.

16:7.9Moral­ity can never be ad­vanced by law or by force. It is a per­sonal and free­will mat­ter and must be dis­sem­i­nated by the con­ta­gion of the con­tact of morally fra­grant per­sons with those who are less morally re­spon­sive, but who are also in some mea­sure de­sirous of do­ing the Fa­ther’s will.

16:7.10Moral acts are those hu­man per­for­mances which are char­ac­ter­ized by the high­est in­tel­li­gence, di­rected by se­lec­tive dis­crim­i­na­tion in the choice of su­pe­rior ends as well as in the se­lec­tion of moral means to at­tain these ends. Such con­duct is vir­tu­ous. Su­preme virtue, then, is whole­heart­edly to choose to do the will of the Fa­ther in heaven.