The Urantia Book

Settings

Reading
Theme
Text size
Line spacing

Typeface

Width
Alignment
Show
Listening

Kept in this browser only.

Paper 103

The Reality of Religious Experience

Melchizedek

1. Philosophy of Religion

103:1.1The unity of re­li­gious ex­pe­ri­ence among a so­cial or racial group de­rives from the iden­ti­cal na­ture of the God frag­ment in­dwelling the in­di­vid­ual. It is this di­vine in man that gives ori­gin to his un­selfish in­ter­est in the wel­fare of other men. But since per­son­al­ity is unique—no two mor­tals be­ing alike—it in­evitably fol­lows that no two hu­man be­ings can sim­i­larly in­ter­pret the lead­ings and urges of the spirit of di­vin­ity which lives within their minds. A group of mor­tals can ex­pe­ri­ence spir­i­tual unity, but they can never at­tain philo­sophic uni­for­mity. And this di­ver­sity of the in­ter­pre­ta­tion of re­li­gious thought and ex­pe­ri­ence is shown by the fact that twen­ti­eth-cen­tury the­olo­gians and philoso­phers have for­mu­lated up­ward of five hun­dred dif­fer­ent def­i­ni­tions of re­li­gion. In re­al­ity, ev­ery hu­man be­ing de­fines re­li­gion in the terms of his own ex­pe­ri­en­tial in­ter­pre­ta­tion of the di­vine im­pulses em­a­nat­ing from the God spirit that in­dwells him, and there­fore must such an in­ter­pre­ta­tion be unique and wholly dif­fer­ent from the re­li­gious phi­los­o­phy of all other hu­man be­ings.

103:1.2When one mor­tal is in full agree­ment with the re­li­gious phi­los­o­phy of a fel­low mor­tal, that phe­nom­e­non in­di­cates that these two be­ings have had a sim­i­lar re­li­gious ex­pe­ri­ence touch­ing the mat­ters con­cerned in their sim­i­lar­ity of philo­sophic re­li­gious in­ter­pre­ta­tion.

103:1.3While your re­li­gion is a mat­ter of per­sonal ex­pe­ri­ence, it is most im­por­tant that you should be ex­posed to the knowl­edge of a vast num­ber of other re­li­gious ex­pe­ri­ences (the di­verse in­ter­pre­ta­tions of other and di­verse mor­tals) to the end that you may pre­vent your re­li­gious life from be­com­ing ego­cen­tric—cir­cum­scribed, self­ish, and unso­cial.

103:1.4Ra­tio­nal­ism is wrong when it as­sumes that re­li­gion is at first a prim­i­tive be­lief in some­thing which is then fol­lowed by the pur­suit of val­ues. Re­li­gion is pri­mar­ily a pur­suit of val­ues, and then there for­mu­lates a sys­tem of in­ter­pre­ta­tive be­liefs. It is much eas­ier for men to agree on re­li­gious val­ues—goals—than on be­liefs—in­ter­pre­ta­tions. And this ex­plains how re­li­gion can agree on val­ues and goals while ex­hibit­ing the con­fus­ing phe­nom­e­non of main­tain­ing a be­lief in hun­dreds of con­flict­ing be­liefs—creeds. This also ex­plains why a given per­son can main­tain his re­li­gious ex­pe­ri­ence in the face of giv­ing up or chang­ing many of his re­li­gious be­liefs. Re­li­gion per­sists in spite of rev­o­lu­tion­ary changes in re­li­gious be­liefs. The­ol­ogy does not pro­duce re­li­gion; it is re­li­gion that pro­duces the­o­logic phi­los­o­phy.

103:1.5That re­li­gion­ists have be­lieved so much that was false does not in­val­i­date re­li­gion be­cause re­li­gion is founded on the rec­og­ni­tion of val­ues and is val­i­dated by the faith of per­sonal re­li­gious ex­pe­ri­ence. Re­li­gion, then, is based on ex­pe­ri­ence and re­li­gious thought; the­ol­ogy, the phi­los­o­phy of re­li­gion, is an hon­est at­tempt to in­ter­pret that ex­pe­ri­ence. Such in­ter­pre­ta­tive be­liefs may be right or wrong, or a mix­ture of truth and er­ror.

103:1.6The re­al­iza­tion of the rec­og­ni­tion of spir­i­tual val­ues is an ex­pe­ri­ence which is super­ide­a­tional. There is no word in any hu­man lan­guage which can be em­ployed to des­ig­nate this “sense,” “feel­ing,” “in­tu­ition,” or “ex­pe­ri­ence” which we have elected to call God-con­scious­ness. The spirit of God that dwells in man is not per­sonal—the Ad­juster is preper­sonal—but this Mon­i­tor pre­sents a value, ex­udes a fla­vor of di­vin­ity, which is per­sonal in the high­est and in­fi­nite sense. If God were not at least per­sonal, he could not be con­scious, and if not con­scious, then would he be in­frahu­man.